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Abstract
This paper presents the principal findings from a three-year research project funded by the
US National Science Foundation (NSF) on ethics of human enhancement technologies. To help
untangle this ongoing debate, we have organized the discussion as a list of questions and answers,
starting with background issues and moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy,
health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity. Each question-andanswer pair is largely self-contained, allowing the reader to skip to those issues of interest without
affecting continuity.
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Allhoff et al.: Ethics of Human Enhancement

“Man is the only creature that refuses to be what he is.”—Albert
Camus (1951, p.11)
A. Introduction
Homo sapiens has been such a prolific species, simply because we are very good
at relentlessly adapting to our environment. At the most basic level, we have won
control over fire and tools to forge a new world around us, we build shelter and
weave clothes to repel the brutal elements, and we raise animals and crops for
predictability in our meals. With our intellect and resourcefulness, we are thereby
better able to survive this world.
However, it is not just the world around us that we desire to change. Since
the beginning of history, we also have wanted to become more than human, to
become Homo superior. From the godlike command of Gilgamesh, to the lofty
ambitions of Icarus, to the preternatural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical skills
of Shaolin monks, and to various shamans and shapeshifters throughout the
world’s cultural history, we have dreamt—and still dream—of transforming
ourselves to overcome our all-too-human limitations.
In practice, this means that we improve our minds through education,
disciplined thinking, and meditation; we improve our bodies with a sound diet and
physical exercise; and we train with weapons and techniques to defend ourselves
from those who would conspire to kill. But today, something seems to be
different. With ongoing work to unravel the mysteries of our minds and bodies,
coupled with the art and science of emerging technologies, we are near the start of
the Human Enhancement Revolution.
Now we are not limited to “natural” methods to enhance ourselves or to
merely wield tools such as a hammer or binoculars or a calculator. We are
beginning to incorporate technology within our very bodies, which may hold
moral significance that we need to consider. These technologies promise great
benefits for humanity—such as increased productivity and creativity, longer lives,
more serenity, stronger bodies and minds, and more—though, as we will discuss
later, there is a question whether these things translate into happier lives, which
many see as the point of it all (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003; Persaud,
2006).
As examples of emerging technologies in the last year or so, a couple
imaginative inventions in particular, among many, are closing the gap even more
between science fiction and the real world. Scientists have conceptualized an
electronic-packed contact lens that may provide the wearer with telescopic and
night vision or act as an omnipresent digital monitor to receive and relay
information (Parviz, et al., 2008). Another innovation is a touch display designed
to be implanted just under the skin that would activate special tattoo ink on one’s
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arm to form images, such as telephone-number keys to punch or even a video to
watch (Mielke, 2008). Together with ever-shrinking computing devices, we
appear to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms (or “cyborgs”), that is, where
machines are integrated with our bodies or at least with our clothing in the nearerterm. Forget about Pocket PCs, mobile phones, GPS devices, and other portable
gadgets; we might soon be able to communicate and access those capabilities
without having to carry any external device, thus raising our productivity,
efficiency, response time, and other desirable measures—in short, enabling us to
even better survive our world.
Technology is clearly a game-changing field. The invention of such
things as the printing press, gunpowder, automobiles, computers, vaccines, and so
on, has profoundly changed the world, for the better we hope. But at the same
time, they have also led to unforeseen consequences, or perhaps consequences
that might have been foreseen and addressed had we bothered to investigate them.
Least of all, they have disrupted the status quo, which is not necessarily a terrible
thing in and of itself; but unnecessary and dramatic disruptions, such as mass
displacements of workers or industries, have real human costs to them. As we
will discuss, this may well be the case with human enhancement technologies,
enabled by advances in nanotechnology, micro-electro-mechanical systems
(MEMS), genetic engineering, robotics, cognitive science, information
technology, pharmacology, and other fields (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003).
In this paper, we examine many ethical and social issues surrounding
human enhancement technologies. For instance, on the issue of whether such
technologies ought to be regulated or otherwise restricted, one position is that
(more than minimal) regulation would hinder personal freedom or autonomy,
infringing on some natural or political right to improve our own bodies, minds,
and lives as we see fit (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005; Harris, 2007; Allhoff et al.,
forthcoming). Others, however, advocate strong regulation—and even a research
moratorium—to protect against unintended effects on society, such as the
presumably-undesirable creation of a new class of enhanced persons who could
outwit, outplay, and outlast “normal” or unenhanced persons for jobs, in schools,
at sporting contests, and so on, among other reasons (Fukuyama, 2003, 2006;
Friends of the Earth, 2006). Still others seek a sensible middle path between
stringent regulation and individual liberty (Hughes, 2004; Greely, 2005).
No matter where one is aligned on this issue, it is clear that the human
enhancement debate is a deeply passionate and personal one, striking at the heart
of what it means to be human. Some see it as a way to fulfill or even transcend
our potential; others see it as a darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s
monster. To help untangle this debate, we have organized this report as the
following list of questions and answers, starting with background issues and
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moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health & safety,
fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity.
Each question-and-answer pair is largely self-contained, allowing the
reader to skip to those issues of interest without affecting continuity much. In
doing so, we are mindful of our audience, which we take to be primarily the
broader public who is not as familiar with the human enhancement debate but
interested in engaging it. At the same time, we offer original analysis that
academics and other experts in the field may find useful.
These discussions are not exhaustive; indeed, many of these questions
would require a book-length treatise for any satisfying answer. Rather, we intend
for this report to broadly survey the human enhancement landscape and its main
contours, not its more intricate rabbit holes and subtler terrain, as other and future
investigations will explore.
B. Definition & Distinctions
1. What is human enhancement?
To begin with, we need to draw several important distinctions.1 Strictly speaking,
“human enhancement” includes any activity by which we improve our bodies,
minds, or abilities—things we do to enhance our well-being. So reading a book,
eating vegetables, doing homework, and exercising may count as enhancing
ourselves, though we do not mean the term this way in our discussion here. These
so-called “natural” human enhancements are morally uninteresting because they
appear to be unproblematic to the extent that it is difficult to see why we should
not be permitted to improve ourselves through diet, education, physical training,
and so on; yet it is still an open question whether emerging, engineered
enhancements might or ought to be unproblematic as well.
Rather, allow us to stipulate for the moment that “human enhancement” is
about boosting our capabilities beyond the species-typical level or statisticallynormal range of functioning for an individual (Norm Daniels, 2000). Relatedly,
“human enhancement” can be understood to be different from “therapy”, which is
about treatments aimed at pathologies that compromise health or reduce one’s
level of functioning below this species-typical or statistically-normal level (Eric
Juengst, 1997). Another way to think about human enhancement technologies, as
opposed to therapy, is that they change the structure and function of the body
(Greely, 2005). Admittedly, none of these definitions is immune to objections, but
1

We recognize that some advocates of human enhancement argue against making such a
distinction, especially between therapy and enhancement (e.g., Bostrom and Roache, 2008), which
seems to more easily justify unrestricted human enhancement. Even if this position is tenable, we
do not want to take that point for granted here, which we will discuss in question 4 below.
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they are nevertheless useful as a starting point in thinking about the distinction,
including whether there really is such a distinction.
Thus, corrective eyeglasses, for instance, would be considered therapy
rather than enhancement, since they serve to bring your vision back to normal; but
strapping on a pair of night-vision binoculars would count as human
enhancement, because they give you sight beyond the range of any unassisted
human vision. As another example, using steroids to help muscular dystrophy
patients regain lost strength is a case of therapy; but steroid use by otherwisehealthy athletes would give them new strength beyond what humans typically
have (thereby enabling them to set new performance records in sports). And
growing or implanting webbing between one’s fingers and toes to enable better
swimming changes the structure and function of those body parts, counting then
as a case of human enhancement and not therapy.
Likewise, as it concerns the mind, taking Ritalin to treat attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is aimed at correcting the deficit; but taken by
otherwise-normal students to enable them to focus better in studying for exams is
a form of human enhancement. And where reading a book may indeed make you
more knowledgeable, it does not make you so much smarter than most everyone
else or push your intellect past natural limits; on the other hand, a computer chip
implanted into your brain that gives you direct access to Google or spreadsheets
would provide mental capabilities beyond the species-typical level.
2. Is the natural-artificial distinction morally significant in this debate?
As we mentioned, strictly speaking, human enhancements seem to include such
activities as reading a book, eating vegetables, doing homework, and exercising.
To the extent that these “natural” enhancements are ethically unproblematic, it
would be tempting to draw a line here in the human enhancement debate such that
“artificial” or “unnatural” enhancements require moral evaluation.
However, the natural-versus-artificial distinction, as a way to identify
human enhancements, may prove most difficult to defend given the vagueness of
the term “natural.” For instance, if we can consider X to be natural if X exists
without any human intervention or can be performed without human-engineered
artifacts, then eating food (that is merely found but perhaps not farmed) and
exercising (e.g., running barefoot but not lifting dumbbells) would still be
considered natural, but reading a book no longer qualifies as a natural activity
(enhancement or not), since books do not exist without humans.
Or if we allow that some human-dependent things can be natural, e.g., a
flint axe or book, depending on their level of complexity or the amount of
engineering required, this seems to specify an arbitrary requirement which too
may be difficult (but not impossible?) to defend. If we want to say that reading
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books is generally a form of natural enhancement (because books are not as
complex to create as, say, a computer), would some books that are difficult to
write or have taken years of research then count as artificial enhancements?
What about reading a simple e-book on Amazon’s Kindle™, which is a clearly a
complex and engineered device?
Further, the natural-artificial distinction often rests on theological or
teleological premises, i.e., that we have God-given goals or limits in life such that
being able to lift 500 pounds over one’s head or living to age 300 is profanely
unnatural and in violation of nature or God’s will. We do not wish to be mired in
such theological issues, as important as they are to theists, though we return
briefly to them in question 16.
3. Is the internal-external distinction morally significant in this debate?
The previous examples suggest a further distinction we should make. By “human
enhancement” we do not mean the mere use of tools, as this would render the
concept impotent, turning nearly everything we do into cases of human
enhancement. But if and when these tools are integrated into our bodies, rather
than employed externally, then we will consider them to be instances of human
enhancement (by stipulation again, for the moment). Of course, this raises the
question: What is so special about incorporating tools as part of our bodies, as
opposed to merely using them externally to the body (Bostrom and Roache,
2008)? That is, why should the former count as human enhancement, but not the
latter? A neural implant that gives access to Google and the rest of the online
world does not seem to be different in kind to using a laptop computer or Pocket
PC to access the same, so why should it matter that we are imbedding computing
power into our heads rather than carrying the same capabilities with us by way of
external devices?
We will not attempt to give a full discussion of that point here, though it
will be important to explore the issue further, except to suggest that integrating
tools into our bodies (and perhaps with our everyday clothing to the extent that we
are rarely without our clothes) appears to give us unprecedented advantages
which may be morally significant. These advantages include having easier,
immediate, and “always-on” access to those new capabilities as if they were a
natural part of our being; we would never be without those devices, as we might
forget to bring a laptop computer with us to a meeting. And assimilating tools
into our persons creates an intimate or enhanced connection with our tools that
evolves our notion of personal identity, more so than simply owning things (as
wearing name-brand clothes might boost one’s sense of self). This may translate
into a substantial advantage for the enhanced person, more so than gained by
purchasing an office computer or reading books or training with the best coaches.
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Therefore, we might reasonably understand the distinction between human
enhancement and mere tools by looking for an always-on (i.e., on-demand or
permanent) feature, as opposed to the temporary or contingent access of our daily
gadgets and tools (e.g., a mobile phone can be easily lost, stolen, or left behind).
But even so, this attempt at a definition still needs further defense, as there are
grey areas that need to be resolved.
For instance, one grey area is that of “smart clothes”—clothing with
devices embedded into them, or clothing made from new, dynamic materials that
may also serve as armor or for medical purposes. If making a device permanent
by embedding or integrating it into our bodies is considered human enhancement,
then it is not clear whether such clothing ought to count as enhancement as well.
On one hand, clothes can be cast aside like an Apple iPhone™, for instance, and
(or because) they are external to us; yet we are almost never without clothes,
which may not be so easy to shed once they are on. So while smart clothes may
not be as permanent as, say, a computer chip implanted in one’s brains, they may
approximate the always-on or 24/7 access characteristic that, we stipulate, tracks
the enhancement-versus-mere tools distinction. Eyeglasses, too, that are not
cumbersome to wear all day (e.g., in contrast to bulky, night-vision goggles
today) and that give us super-vision or double as a computer display might
plausibly be called an enhancement. Therefore, we do not recognize the central
distinction in this debate as between internal or implanted tools and tools external
to our bodies, which is a distinction that seems to carry less prima facie moral
relevance and would need greater argument to establish.
This is not to say that an enhancement-versus-tools distinction is
ultimately defensible or not, but only that it does not help an early investigation
into the ethics of using such technological innovations—whatever we want to call
them—to consider “enhancement” so broadly that it obscures our intuitive
understanding of the concept and makes everything that gives us an advantage in
life into an enhancement.
If our considered distinction here cannot ultimately be defended—that is,
if there is no moral significance in using an enhancing device internally or
externally to our bodies—then the implication is that all tools, from hammers to
hardhats and from cars to computers, ought to be recognized as forms of human
enhancement. And there’s a prima facie case to be made that, if hammers and
computers can be used without moral risk, then more fantastical tools, e.g., neural
implants or gene therapy to halt aging or give superhuman strength, should also
be morally permissible. However, this is not the end of the debate, since we
might agree that human enhancement technologies per se are not morally
problematic, but their use in certain applications or areas of life could still be
questionable.
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4. Is the therapy-enhancement distinction morally significant in this debate?
Returning to an issue previously raised in question 1—and as a perhaps more
critical distinction to elucidate—some scholars have reasonably objected that
there is no real distinction between therapy and enhancement, which would mean
that our working definition is inadequate. For instance, how should we think
about vaccinations: are they a form of therapy, or are they an enhancement of our
immune system (Daniels, 2000; Harris, 2007; Bostrom and Roache, 2008)? On
one hand, a vaccination seems to be an enhancement in that there is no existing
pathology it is attempting to cure, merely a possible or likely pathology we wish
to avoid; but we are drawn to declare it as some form of therapy—perhaps
preventative therapy—given its close association with medicine? And if
enhancements in general are ultimately found to be socially or ethically
problematic, then counting vaccinations as enhancement opens the possibility that
it should be regulated or restricted, which would create a serious public health
disaster as well as a counter-example to the claim that enhancements are
problematic. Thus, even critics of human enhancement may be loathe to put
vaccinations in the enhancement bucket, though there does not seem to be an
obviously superior reason to think otherwise.
Another dilemma: If a genius were to sustain a head injury, thereby
reducing her IQ to merely the “average” or “species-normal” range, would raising
her intelligence back to its initial “genius” level count as therapy or enhancement
(Bostrom and Roache, 2008)? Either one would seem plausible, but is there a
non-arbitrary reason for answering the question either way? If an enhancement,
then how do we explain the difference between that and a clear (or clearer) case
of therapy in which we return an “average” person who sustains a head injury
back to the “normal” IQ range?
The therapy-enhancement distinction holds real stakes, beyond athletic
and academic competition. Recent news reports show that the US military is
increasingly prescribing anti-depressants to soldiers in combat to alleviate posttraumatic stress as well as stimulants to counteract sleep deprivation—actions
which could be viewed as either creating a more effective, level-headed soldier or
returning the soldier to the initial “normal” state of combat readiness, further
blurring the distinction (M. Thompson, 2008; Saletan, 2008).2
The above cases notwithstanding, we would agree that there are
difficulties in precisely defining “human enhancement” (as there is with making
clear definitions of nearly any other concept), but maintaining the enhancement2

However, if the military were to prescribe such medications prior to combat, then one could
make the case for counting that as an enhancement; but this may take us full circle back to the
vaccination question, particularly as soldiers are routinely vaccinated against bio-threats such as
anthrax.
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therapy distinction, at least until it can be more fully explored, is nonetheless
important for several reasons:
First, to the extent that pro-enhancement advocates are primarily the ones
arguing against the therapy-enhancement distinction, if a goal is to engage the
anti-enhancement camp, then it would make for a far stronger case to meet those
critics on their own ground (i.e., to grant the assumption that such a distinction
exists). If it proves overly charitable to grant this assumption such that the proenhancement position is too difficult to defend without it, then perhaps more
attention needs to be paid in arguing against the distinction in the first place,
given that the debate may hinge on this fundamental issue.
Second, by not making these distinctions, specifically between therapy
and enhancement, it may be too easy to argue that all forms of human
enhancement are morally permissible given that the things we count as therapy
are permissible. That is to say, we risk making a straw man argument that does
not make a compelling case either for or against any aspect of human
enhancement. Again, if the human enhancement debate turns on this distinction,
then much more attention should be paid to defending or criticizing the distinction
than has been to date.
Third, at least part of the reason that human enhancement is believed by
both sides of the debate to be the most important controversy in science and
society this new century (Hurlbut, 2006) seems to be that it represents a collision
between our intuitions and our actions. For instance, critics may believe that
human enhancement technologies give an unfair advantage to some persons,
fracturing local or global societies (even more) between the haves and have-nots
(Fukuyama 2002, 2006; President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003; Selgelid, 2007).
Yet, at the same time, they seem to endorse—to the extent that they have not
raised objections to—our use of existing technologies (e.g., mobile phones,
computers, Internet) that also seem to countenance the same division to which
human enhancement technologies are said to lead us.
As another example, advocates of human enhancement may believe that
individual autonomy should trump health and safety concerns, e.g., athletes
should be permitted to take steroids or adults should be allowed to take moodenhancing drugs at will (Naam, 2005; Savulescu and Foddy, 2007). Yet, at the
same time, they do not offer objections to keeping some drugs illegal, such as
crystal meth or crack cocaine, which becomes an even more complicated dilemma
if they advocate legalizing other contraband such as marijuana.
This is not to say that these tensions with our intuitions are irresolvable,
but only that “common sense” is at stake for both sides of the debate. And the
initial intuition for the overwhelming majority of us is that there is a therapyenhancement distinction (since we understand “therapy” and “enhancement” as
meaningfully discrete terms, even if some cases do not neatly fit into either
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category). So it would be more interesting for pro-enhancement advocates to
reconcile their position with that intuition, if possible, rather than to reject the
distinction, which is less satisfying. Or if the therapy-enhancement distinction
really is untenable, then more vigorous argument seems to be needed before we
are prepared to cast aside our intuition.
Fourth, the famous philosophical puzzle “The Paradox of the Heap”
should be recalled here: Given a heap of sand with N number of grains of sand, if
we remove one grain of sand, we are still left with a heap of sand (that now only
has N-1 grains of sand). If we remove one more grain, we are again left with a
heap of sand (that now has N-2 grains). If we extend this line of reasoning and
continue to remove grains of sand, we see that there is no clear point P where we
can definitely say that a heap of sand exists on one side of P, but less than a heap
exists on the other side. In other words, there is no clear distinction between a
heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap or even no sand at all. However, the wrong
conclusion to draw here is that there is no difference between them or that the
distinction between a heap and no-heap should be discarded (or between being
bald and having hair, as a variation of the paradox goes). Likewise, it would seem
fallacious to conclude that there is no difference between therapy and
enhancement or that we should dispense with the distinction. It may still be the
case that there is no moral difference between the two, but we cannot arrive at it
through the argument that there is no clear defining line or that there are some
cases (such as vaccinations, etc.) that make the line fuzzy. As with “heap”, the
terms “therapy” and “enhancement” may simply be vaguely constructed and
require more precision to clarify the distinction (Buyx, 2008).
Therefore, at least for the time being and for the purposes of this report,
we will assume that a therapy-enhancement distinction is defensible and
illuminative, at least where it aligns with our intuitions. Even if it is not, again,
this does not mean the end of the human enhancement debate: it could still be that
some enhancements (and therapies) are morally problematic in certain
applications or areas of life, i.e., contexts may matter.
C. Contexts & Scenarios
5. Why would contexts matter in the ethics of human enhancement?
We allow that it may ultimately be the case that the therapy-enhancement
distinction may be shallow and/or that enhancements per se are not morally
relevant; but we leave those as open questions to be explored in this embryonic
stage of the debate. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that human enhancements
need to be considered separately according to their type or application in an ethics
investigation. So, for instance, even if we do not consider vaccines as
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preventative therapy (which may be the more natural way to see it) but view them
as enhancements of our immune system, that does not imply that all
enhancements are morally unproblematic.
What counts as an enhancement and whether it is morally relevant seems
to be context-dependent. For example, we can imagine a society in which strict
equality is the all-important value, trumping individual rights to life, liberty,
knowledge, and so on; thus immunizing a person from a serious disease might be
prohibited in such a world, so to not upset egalitarian values or disrupt social
institutions that strongly rely on a certain range of life expectancy, e.g., a social
security system. Another example: freely burning fossil fuels was less morally
significant in 1910 than it is in 2010, given our current awareness of global
warming, pollution, and their causes and effects. Therefore, context matters, and
so it seems premature to say that all enhancement are morally worrisome,
irrespective of context; but it is also premature to declare all of them to be
unproblematic, especially at a start of debate exactly about those questions.
For a similar reason, it does not really help to dismantle or obviate the
therapy-enhancement distinction by claiming that “everything good is an
enhancement” as we first considered in question 1—that education, diet, exercise,
etc. are all enhancements, and because these instances are unobjectionable, then
no enhancement is intrinsically problematic.
Besides being a loose
generalization, we could make an argument that even education, diet, etc. do have
ethical implications (in that they may create inequities among individuals), but
that these implications are outweighed by other considerations, such as liberty, the
value of self-improvement, and so on; and that is why education, diet, etc. are
unobjectionable, all things considered.
Or we can make an argument that strict equality is not morally required in
the first place, given the natural and manageable range of variations in our
species; but if some future vaccine takes us well beyond this “normal” range, e.g.,
super-longevity or super-strength, our social systems (including law and public
policy) are not equipped to account for those extra abilities, thereby raising latent
issues of equity, fairness, access, etc. back to the forefront. Similarly, we can
imagine a world in which cognitive enhancements no longer hold much
controversy as they do today, after social structures in the future have adapted to
account for them—just like, e.g., steroid use in sports might no longer be an
ethical issue (perhaps only a health issue) if we create separate competitions for
the enhanced as well as unenhanced. Again, context seems to matter.
6. What are some examples of enhancement for cognitive performance?
In the area of improving mental performance, individuals are already using
pharmaceuticals available today to achieve such goals as increased productivity,
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creativity, serenity, and happiness. We previously mentioned Ritalin use,
intended for ADHD patients, by otherwise-normal students to boost concentration
as a way to study more effectively. In sports, drugs such as beta-blockers,
intended to treat high blood pressure and other disorders by slowing down the
heart rate, have been used to reduce anxiety as a way to boost physical
performance, such as in preparing for an important and nerve-racking putt in golf
or steadying an archer’s hand to better release the arrow in between heartbeats. In
warfare, anti-depressants and stimulants have been used to treat post-traumatic
stress and sleep deprivation, thereby creating better, more effective soldiers. And,
of course, hallucinogenic and other recreational drugs, including alcohol, continue
to be used (and used famously by some authors and artists) to achieve greater
creativity, relaxation, and even enlightenment.
In the future, as technology becomes more integrated with our bodies, we
can expect neural implants of the kind we mentioned above that effectively puts
computer chips into our brains or allows devices to be plugged directly into our
heads, giving us always-on access to information as well as unprecedented
information-processing powers. New and future virtual reality programs are able
to much better simulate activities, for instance, to train law enforcement officers
and soldiers in dangerous situations so that they can respond better to similar
events in the real world.
7. What are some examples of enhancement for physical performance?
In the area of physical performance, steroids use by athletes is one of the most
obvious examples. Cosmetic surgery has also grown in popularity, not for
corrective purposes but to increase (perceived) attractiveness, and this has ethical
and genetic implications (Scott, 2009). Prosthetic limbs have improved to such a
degree that they are already enabling greater than normal strength and capabilities
to those that use them, sparking a debate on whether athletes with those artificial
limbs may participate in the Olympics (Edwards, 2008a).
In the future, we can expect continuing advances in robotics and
bionanotechnology to give us cybernetic body parts, from bionic arms to artificial
noses and ears, that surpass the capabilities of our natural body. Today, research
organizations such as MIT’s Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies are working
on an exoskeleton to give the wearer superhuman strength as well as flexible
battlesuits that can, for instance, harden when needed to create a splint or
tourniquet to attend to injuries more quickly and effectively (MIT, 2008). And
we previously mentioned innovative designs such as for contact lenses that enable
us to see in the dark or receive information from a miniature digital monitor.
Further, designs have already been drawn for even more fantastic innovations
such as a respirocyte: an artificial red blood cell that holds a reservoir of oxygen
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(Freitas, 1998). A respirocyte would come in handy for, say, a heart attack victim
to continue breathing for an extra hour until medical treatment is available,
despite a lack of blood circulation to the lungs or anywhere else. But in an
otherwise-healthy athlete, a respirocyte could boost performance by delivering
extra oxygen to the muscles, as if the person were breathing from a pure oxygen
tank.
And perhaps as an example of both mental and physical enhancement, we
should also consider life extension, whether it comes by curing fatal pathologies
(such as cancer) or rejuvenating the body/mind or developing anti-aging
medicine, and whether it enables us to live another 20 or 100 or 1,000 years
(radical life extension). This is a particularly contentious issue in the human
engineering debate, not just for obvious concerns related to the burden of
overpopulation on quality of life or loss of meaning in life, but also because it
seems that we are already—and presumably unproblematically—extending our
lives through better nutrition, medicine, exercise, sanitation, and so forth; yet
there is something troubling to many about the prospect of radical life extension,
even if we can all agree that, in principle, more life is better than less life. We
will return to this in question 13 below.
8. Should a non-therapeutic procedure that provides no net benefit be called an
“enhancement”?
Some applications of technology or modifications of our bodies may seem
gratuitous, such as attempting to physically transform into a lizard by tattooing
scales all over one’s body and forking one’s tongue, or into a cat by implanting
whiskers, sharpening teeth and clipping one’s ears, or into something other than
human with implanted horns in one’s forehead; all of these procedures have been
done already. In the future, we can envision the possibility that prosthetic
flippers, designed today for dolphins, along with artificial gills, etc., might be
requested by humans who want to transform into an aquatic animal. This type of
enhancement, of course, brings to the forefront the question whether
“enhancement” is the right word to use in the debate in the first place, as opposed
to simply “human engineering” or a more neutral term that does not imply
improvement. Indeed, even in cases where technology boosts mental and
physical capabilities, it seems that we cannot predict with any accuracy whether
there will be any negative psychological or physiological side-effects that will
offset the intended benefits of a particular enhancement. For instance, in drinking
alcohol as a mood-enhancer of sorts, we already know that it can hold the
unintended effect of a painful hangover, and steroids taken by athletes can have
disastrous health consequences; in such cases, we cannot easily say the benefits
outweigh the harms.
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Moreover, if human enhancement can be ultimately defended, then unenhancements may seem to be morally permissible as well, if individual
autonomy is the most important value to consider in the debate (P. Thompson,
2008). There are already medical cases in which: individuals want to amputate
some healthy limb from their bodies (Dyer, 2000); parents want to stunt the
growth of their bedridden child to keep her portable and easier to care for
(Edwards, 2008b); and deaf parents who specifically want a deaf baby in selecting
embryos for in vitro fertilization (Dennis, 2004). Un-enhancements aside, we will
continue to use “enhancement” in this report for the most part, since there is a
presumption that whatever technology is integrated with our bodies will be
expected to deliver some net benefit, real or perceived (otherwise, why do it?).
Further, we will limit our discussion here primarily to those technologies that
enhance human cognitive and physical abilities, rather than seemingly-gratuitous
procedures or un-enhancements.
D. Freedom & Autonomy
9. Could we justify human enhancement technologies by appealing to our right
to be free?
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in democracies, than the cherished
concept of freedom, loosely defined here as the absence of constraints. But
because freedom is central to the issue of human enhancement, it adds much fuel
to the impassioned debate. Pro-enhancement advocates have argued against
regulating enhancements on the grounds that it would infringe on our fundamental
ability to choose how we want to live our own lives (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005;
Harris, 2007). Or, in other words, if enhancing our bodies does not hurt anyone
(other than possibly ourselves; more on this in question 10), then why should we
be prevented from doing so? This is a common objection—arguing especially
against governmental intervention—to any number of proposals that involve
regulation, from hiring practices to home improvements to school clothing and so
on.
Though freedom may be viewed in democracies as a “sacred cow” that
ought not be corralled, the reality is that we do not have complete freedom in the
areas of life that we think we do anyway. As examples, freedom of the press and
freedom of speech do not protect the individual from charges of libel, slander, or
inciting panic by yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theater; our privacy expectations
quietly give way to security measures, such as searches on our property and
persons at airports or eavesdropping on our communications; and even ancestral
homes built by the hands of one’s forefathers could be unilaterally seized (and
demolished) by the state under eminent domain laws. This is to say that whatever
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rights we have also imply responsibilities and exist within some particular
political system, therefore it is not unreasonable to expect or define certain limits
for those rights, especially where they conflict with other rights and obligations.
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissez-faire or minimal state, but a
democratic society is not compelled to endorse such a stance, as some political
philosophers have suggested (e.g., Nozick, 1974). Nor would reasonable people
necessarily want unrestricted freedom anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background
checks for gun ownership. Even the most liberal democracy today understands
the value of regulations as a way to enhance our freedom. For instance, our
economic system is not truly a “free market”: though we may advocate freedom
in general, regulations exist not only to protect our rights, but also to create an
orderly process that greases the economic wheel, accelerating both innovations
and transactions. As a simpler example, by imposing laws on traffic, we can
actually increase our freedom: by driving forward on only one side of the road,
for instance, we can be (more) assured that we will not be a victim of a head-on
collision, which makes driving faster a more sensible proposition.
There is another sense, related to free will, in which cognitive
enhancements may be infringing: if an enhancement, such as a mood-altering
drug or neural implant, interferes or alters our deliberative process, then it is an
open question whether or not we are truly acting freely while under the influence
of the enhancement. For instance, a “citizen chip” embedded in the brain might
cause us to be unswervingly patriotic and hold different values than we would
otherwise have. Further, external pressure from peers, employers, competitors,
national security, and others to accept a particular enhancement also may unduly
influence one’s decision making. (Guston, Parsi, and Tosi, 2007.)
10. Could we justify enhancing humans if it harms no one other than perhaps
the individual?
To justify restrictions on our freedom and autonomy, of course, we would need
strong, compelling reasons to offset that prima facie harm; specifically, we need
to identify conflicting values that ought to be factored into our policymaking.
One possible reason is that human enhancement technologies may pose a health
risk to the person operated upon, similar to illegal or unprescribed steroids use by
athletes: given how precious little we still know about how our brains and other
biological systems work, any tinkering with those systems would likely give rise
to unintended effects, from mild to most serious (President’s Council on
Bioethics, 2003). Even drinking pure water—perhaps the safest thing we can do
to our own bodies—may have some harms. For example, maybe we become
dependent on fluoridated water to prevent tooth decay or drink too much water
which dilutes sodium in the body to dangerously-low or fatal levels. Or consider
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that many of the foods we eat everyday are suspected to have some causal
connection to disease or unwanted conditions. It is therefore quite likely that
making radical changes to our bodies undoubtedly will have surprising sideeffects.
Is this reason enough to restrict human enhancement technologies, for the
sake of protecting the would-be patient? The answer is not clear. Even if such
technologies prove to be so dangerous or risky that we strongly believe we need
to protect individuals from their own decisions to use those technologies (through
paternalistic regulations), the well-informed individual might circumvent this
issue by freely and knowingly consenting to those risks, thereby removing this
reason to restrict use.
But even this case does not solve the conflict between autonomy and
health/safety. First, it is not always clear whether a person’s consent is
sufficiently informed or not. For instance, consider a partygoer who may have
heard that smoking cigarettes can be addictive and harmful but nonetheless begins
to smoke anyway; this seems to be a less-informed decision than one made by a
person with a parent whose smoking caused a specific and horrible illness (and
associated expenses). Furthermore, the partygoer may be unduly influenced by
peers or movies that glamorize smoking. So paternalistic regulations could be
justified under some circumstances; e.g., where risks are not adequately
communicated or understood, for children, and so on.
Second, the assumption that a procedure to implant some human
enhancement technology may affect the health and safety of only that patient
appears to be much too generous. Indeed, it is rare to find any human activity that
has absolutely no impact on other persons, either directly or indirectly, such that
our own freedom or autonomy is the only value at stake and clearly should be
protected. For instance, opponents to regulating such activities as gambling,
recreational drugs (including smoking tobacco), prostitution, segregation, and so
forth commonly cite the need to protect their freedom or rights as the primary
objection to those regulations. Yet, this objection ignores the opposing argument,
which is that such activities may harm other persons, either actually or
statistically.
To look at just one of many examples, at first glance, unfettered gambling
seems to affect only the gambler (it is his money to win or lose, so the argument
goes); but a broader analysis would point out that many gamblers have families
whose bank accounts are being risked and that desperate gamblers may commit
crimes to finance their addiction, never mind harms to the out-of-control gambler
himself. Even marijuana use, which in many cases may be justified and allegedly
harms no one, might be traced back to dangerous cartels that terrorize or bully the
local population. Furthermore, irresponsible use of the drug could cause
accidents or the user to neglect his or her obligations, family, etc. Notice here that
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we are not arguing that activities such as gambling and recreational drug use
should be completely banned, but only that some measure of oversight seems to
be appropriate for the sake of others, if not also for the welfare of the individual.
Relating back to the human enhancement debate, it seems premature to
say that only the would-be enhanced person assumes any risk, even if the
procedure does not affect his or her germline (i.e., cannot be passed on to the next
generation). The harm or risk to others could also be indirect: Where steroids use
by athletes sets the presumably-wrong example for children whose bodies and
minds are still developing, we can anticipate a similar temptation to be created
with human enhancement technologies among children. Even parents may feel
pressure—or even an obligation—to enhance their children, which arises from the
natural desire to want the best for our children or, in this case, make them the best
they can be (see question 21).
Third, even if the harm that arises from any given instance of human
enhancement is so small as to be practically negligible, the individual choices to
enhance oneself can lead to aggregate harms that are much larger and substantial.
For instance, in today’s environmental debate, calls are increasing to limit
activities from lawn care or drinking bottled water: on one hand, the amount of
extra water needed to keep one’s lawn green seems small, as is also the amount of
fertilizer or pesticide that might leach into the groundwater, but the cumulative
effect of millions of homeowners caring for a pristine patch of grass can be
disastrous for a nation’s water supply and health.
Likewise, as human enhancement technologies improve and are adopted
by more people, the once-negligible harms that arise from individual cases may
metastasize into very real harms to large segments of society (Parfit, 1986). Life
extension, as one case, may appear to be a great benefit for the individual, but on
an aggregate scale, it could put pressure or burdens on families, retirement
programs, overpopulation, and so on; we will return to this in question 13.
E.

Fairness & Equity

11. Does human enhancement raise issues of fairness, access, and equity?
Even if we can understand why there would be pressure to enhance one’s self or
children, it is important to note the following: advantages gained by enhanced
persons also imply a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced, whether in sports,
employment opportunities, academic performance, or any other area. That is to
say, fairness is another value to consider in the debate. A related worry is that the
wealthy would be the first adopters of human enhancement technologies, given
that they can best afford such innovations (like LASIK eye surgery), thus creating
an even wider gap between the haves and the have-nots (McKibben, 2004).
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In considering the issue of fairness, we need to be careful to not conflate it
with equality. Under most economic theories, fairness does not require that we
need to close the gap entirely between economic classes, even when justice is
defined as fairness (Rawls, 1971; for an application of Rawls to enhancement, see
Allhoff, 2005). Indeed, there are good reasons to think that we want some gap to
exist, for example, to provide incentives for innovations, in order to move up the
economic ladder, and to allow flexibility in a workforce to fill vacancies and
perform a wide range of tasks. At least some competition seems to be desirable,
especially when resources to be allocated are limited or scarce and when
compared to the historically-unsuccessful alternative of the state attempting to
equalize the welfare of its citizens.
Thus, inequality itself is not so much the point, though any poverty or
decline in welfare related to increased inequality may be a serious concern. We
do not want people to stop striving to improve their own lives, even if the
situation for others is not improved at the same time or ever. And natural
advantages and inequities already exist without moral issues anyway; Hobbes
recognized that these organic differences did not give any individual or group of
individuals so much net advantage that they would be invulnerable to the “nasty,
brutish, and short” conditions that mark human life (Hobbes, 1651).
Yet if human enhancement technologies develop as predicted, they can
afford us a tremendous advantage in life; e.g., over others in a competition for
resources, so much so that it overstretches the natural range of equality to the
point where inequality becomes a more salient issue. This is where the gap
between enhanced and unenhanced persons may be too wide to bridge, making
the latter into dinosaurs in a hypercompetitive world. If we assume that the
benefits of being an enhanced person must be largely paid from the welfare of
others, e.g., a job-gain by one person is a job-loss by another, since the others are
now at a relative disadvantage, this may impoverish the unenhanced, which would
limit their access to such things as healthcare, legal representation, political
influence, and so on.
Related to the notion of equity is that of fairness. Even if pronounced
inequality is morally permissible, there is still a question of how an individual
accesses or affords a human enhancement technology, which may be unfair or
unacceptably magnify the inequality. If the distribution of or access to
enhancement technologies is not obviously unfair, e.g., illegally discriminatory,
then perhaps we can justify the resulting inequities. But what would count as a
fair distribution of those technologies? A scheme based on need or productivity
or any other single dimension would be easily defeated by the standard arguments
that they overlook other relevant dimensions (Rescher, 1980). Even if a market
system is considered to be fair or an acceptable approximation of it, many still
object to the unfairness of our starting points, which may result from bad luck or
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other arbitrary circumstances, or date back to monarchies, aristocracies, “robber
barons”—recall the saying that behind every great fortune there is a great crime
(de Balzac, 1835). And even if the starting points were fair, the subsequent
market processes would need to be fair in order for the results (e.g., that only the
wealthy can afford human enhancement technologies, who then gain significant
advantages over the unenhanced) to be declared fair (Nozick, 1974).
12. Will it matter if there is an “enhancement divide”?
We have heard much about the “digital divide”, but one day there may well be a
“nano divide”: the gap between those who can access and benefit from
nanotechnology and those without. If there is also an “enhancement divide”, it
could prove to be an even greater disadvantage for those on the wrong side. They
would not be as physically or mentally capable as others. What policies, if any,
should be developed to either avoid or cope with this situation?
The rise of information and communications technology (ICT) led to the
so-called “digital divide”: those who did not have adequate access to the
technology were disadvantaged relative to those who did. While this divide
reflected, by and large, the existing divide between haves and have-nots, ICT
exaggerated that divide (Rooksby and Weckert, 2004). Not long ago, the lessadvantaged within developed societies could listen to the radio, go to the free
public library, and read inexpensive newspapers.
As information and
communication increasingly moved to the Internet, their access to both
information and communication decreased relative to that by the moreadvantaged. It is feared by some that nanotechnology will also sharpen and widen
divisions both within societies and between nations: a nanodivide will be created.
Whether or not this happens depends partly on how nanotechnology develops. If
its applications are primarily in enhancing existing materials, cosmetics,
electronics and medicine and if these are relatively inexpensive, then there may be
no increase in inequalities. However, if they are expensive and particularly useful
and desirable, then they probably will.
This in itself does not show that there is a problem, of course. There is a
problem only if the created inequalities are unfair and therefore morally wrong.
Technologies have both benefits and costs and inequities can occur in both. Just
as benefits can be distributed unequally, so can the costs, but none of these
inequalities is necessarily wrong, it can be argued. The argument that they do not
matter morally can be derived from a number of ethical theories, but it also
depends on the particular enhancements in question. Enhancements for a few that
enable them to better solve the world’s environmental problems would satisfy
Rawls’ difference principle in that the extra inequality in ability would help the
worst off (Rawls, 1971). Enhancements in sporting ability or other abilities that
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benefit only the person enhanced would fall foul of that principle and so perhaps
should not be allowed. They might however, be justified on utilitarian grounds, if
they help increase total happiness, or on the basis of desert or some other way. So
the question “Will it matter if there is an enhancement divide?”, like many of the
questions we explore in this report, cannot be easily answered but will involve an
examination of the enhancements in question and of the underlying ethical
theories.
F.

Societal Disruptions

13. What kind of societal disruptions might arise from human enhancement?
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical values, but they have practical
effects. Gross inequality itself, whether fair or not, can motivate the worse-off
masses to revolt against a state or system. But societal disruption need not be so
extreme to be taken seriously. Entire institutions today—as well as the lack
thereof—are based on a specific range of abilities and rough equality of natural
assets. Sports, for instance, would change dramatically, if enhanced persons are
permitted to compete to the clear disadvantage of unenhanced athletes, smashing
their previous records. (This is not to say that sports should ban enhanced
competitors, only that doing so would have a real, significant affect on careers
and expend valuable resources to adjust sporting programs and contests; and in
the end, it is not clear that sports is better off for its trouble or that which it has
caused.)
Other institutions and systems include economic (jobs), privacy,
communications, pensions, security, and many other areas of society. For
instance, if life-extension technologies can increase our average lifespan by 20
years—let alone the 100+ years predicted by some futurists (Kurzweil, 2005; de
Grey, 2007), and assuming that the extra 20 years will be a good life, not one
bogged down with illness and diminishing productivity that afflict many elderly
today—then we would need to radically adjust retirement programs: do we move
the retirement age to 85, which has negative consequences for job-seekers such as
new tenure-track academic faculty, or increase contributions to pension plans,
which puts pressure on household budgets and employers? Or both? Also,
assuming birth rates do not decline (which causes problems of its own), longer
lives will mean more pressure on resources such as energy and food, in addition
to jobs, so this could disrupt society in negative ways.
Looking more into the distance, if enhancement technologies enable us to
adapt our bodies to, say, underwater living (with implantable gills, flippers,
echolocation, new skin, etc.), then we would need to construct new institutions to
govern that lifestyle, from underwater real estate to pollution rules to law
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enforcement to handling electronic devices to currency (replacing paper money of
non-waterworlds). Or if this sounds too far-fetched, consider humanity’s rush
into outer space that will require similar attention to be paid to such issues in the
near future (Lin, 2006).
Other nearer-term scenarios that may cause social disruption include: a job
candidate with a neural implant that enables better data retention and faster
information processing would consistently beat out unenhanced candidates; a
person with super-human hearing or sight could circumvent existing privacy
protections and expectations by easily and undetectably eavesdropping or spying
on others; more students (and professors) using Ritalin may grab admission or
tenure at all the best universities, reducing those opportunities for others; and so
on.
14. Are societal disruptions reason enough to restrict human enhancement?
From the preceding answer, societal disruption is clearly a non-trivial concern and
seems to be something we want to mitigate where we can, though this does not
imply that we should resist change in general. Minimizing disruption might be
achieve by transitioning laid-off workers immediately to a new job or job-training
program, rather than allowing the layoffs to come unexpectedly which leaves the
newly-unemployed with few options but to fend for themselves. Today, without
this kind of preparation, we trust that these social and economic disruptions
eventually will be handled, but there is still a real cost to those affected by layoff
that could have been better mitigated. The typewriter industry, as an example,
was blindsided by the fast-growing word-processing industry in the 1980s,
leading to the displacement of thousands of workers, both on the manufacturing
and the end-users’ sides. (Similar situation exist for the spreadsheet industry that
displaced countless accountants and bookkeepers, the computer-aided design
industry that displaced graphic artists, and so on.)
But, unless it will be clearly and seriously harmful, social disruption by
itself does not seem enough to count as a strong reason against regulating
enhancement technologies. After all, we do not wish that typewriters were never
replaced with word-processing programs, though we hope the affected employees
readily found gainful jobs elsewhere. Human enhancement technologies,
likewise, do not necessarily need to be halted or regulated, but it seems more
prudent and responsible to anticipate and prepare for any disruptive effects.
To be clear, there presumably will be benefits to society from enhanced
persons. We can expect greater productivity or more creative and intellectual
breakthroughs, which is why individuals would want to be enhanced in the first
place. But what remains difficult to calculate is whether these gains outweigh the
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costs or risks, or even the likelihood of either gains or costs—which is needed if
we do find it sensible to use a precautionary principle to guide our policymaking.
15. If individuals are enhanced differently, will communication be more
difficult or impossible?
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein (1953) said that if a lion could
speak, we could not understand it; and in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,
Lewis Carroll (1865) demonstrates some problems that Alice had communicating
with a caterpillar. Both examples highlight the importance of the body in
communication. For Wittgenstein sharing a language involves sharing a form of
life, and lions and humans are too different to share the latter so they cannot share
the former either. Language is social, and we communicate with each other about
experiences that we have reason to believe we can all understand, more or less.
This is a plausible belief given that we are the same species, made of the same
stuff, close to the same shape, and with the same sense organs.
But what if we were radically different from each other? Suppose that
some humans had the vision of an eagle or could see infrared. If some of us have
enhanced vision or quite different vision, how would this affect communication
and general social cohesion? Or consider a more radical situation in which
someone is enhanced by the addition of a different sense; for example, the
echolocation capabilities of a bat. Suppose too that it became possible to have
enhancements of numerous kinds and that we could choose which we wanted, if
any. Could a conservative, unenhanced human, communicate easily with highlyenhanced neighbors who had all kinds of experiences of which he could not
conceive? Probably not. And communication may be even more difficult
between people who have quite different enhancements.
The answer to the question is that almost certainly communication would
become more difficult. Just how difficult is partly an empirical matter, of course.
Sighted people can communicate with the sight-impaired. But given what we
know about the social nature of language and the importance of shared
experiences in communication, it is difficult to see how problems could be
avoided. None of this may matter of course. We, as we currently are, are social
creatures, but our enhanced heirs may not be, or not in the way that we are. They
may not mind if there are few with whom they can easily communicate.
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G.

Human Dignity & The Good Life

16. Does the notion of human dignity suffer with human enhancements?
The fiercest resistance to human enhancement technologies is perhap a concern
about their effect on “human dignity” and what it means to be human (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2007). For instance, does the desire for
enhancement show ingratitude for what we have and (further) enable an attitude
of unquenchable dissatisfaction with one’s life? Some researchers suggest that
discontent is hardwired into the genetic makeup of humans (Hill, 2006; Woodall,
2007), which is why we constantly innovate, strive to achieve and gain more, etc.
However, even if this is true, it does not seem to be so much an argument to
promote human enhancement technologies, but more a worry that those
technologies are not the panacea or Holy Grail of happiness we might believe
them to be; that is, we will still be dissatisfied with ourselves no matter how much
we enhance ourselves (unless, of course, we somehow eradicate that part of our
DNA that causes discontent).
Would human enhancement technologies hinder moral development?
Many believe that “soul-making” is impossible without struggle (Hick, 1966), and
achievements ring hollow without sacrifice or effort (President’s Council on
Bioethics, 2003); so if technology makes life and competitions easier, then we
may lose opportunities to feed and grow our moral character. On the other hand,
compare our lives today with pre-Internet days: increased connectivity to friends,
work, information, etc. is often a double-edged proposition that also increases
stress and decreases free time. This, then, raises the related concern of whether
enhancement technologies will actually make our lives happier. (If the research
mentioned above about discontent in our genes is accurate, then we might have a
psychobiological reason to think not.)
Is the frailty of the human condition necessary to best appreciate life?
There is something romantic about the notion of being mortal and fallible. But
with existing pharmacology, we could eliminate the emotion of sadness today,
and work is continuing on drugs that repress memories; but it is not clear that
sadness (at least in the normal range, as opposed to clinical depression) is a
“pathology” we should want to eliminate, rather than a human experience that we
should preserve (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003). Other critics have
suggested that life could be too long, leading to boredom after one’s life-goals are
achieved (e.g., Williams, 1973).
Finally, we will mention here the related, persistent concern that we are
playing God with world-changing technologies, which is presumably bad (Peters,
2007). But what exactly counts as “playing God”, and why is that morally wrong;
i.e., where exactly is the proscription in religious scripture? If we define the
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concept as manipulating nature, then we all have been guilty of that since the first
man picked up a stick. Making life-and-death decisions is a plausible candidate
as a definition, but then physicians as well as soldiers (even in holy wars?) could
be accused of this charge.
17. Will we need to rethink the notion of a “good life”?
Up until now, we have had a reasonably good idea of what makes life better, and
we can be fairly confident about what makes life better for most, and, although
this is more controversial, roughly what constitutes a good life. For Aristotle, the
one thing that everyone wanted for its own sake was happiness, and the best way
of achieving this was through a life of contemplation, or study (Aristotle, 1941
trans.). Happiness (or eudaimonia) for Aristotle was a much richer concept than
it currently is for us. It involved living well and doing well, it was something that
lasted for a sustained period (one could not be happy for just an hour), and it
could not apply to just one aspect of life. In general, it meant overall success,
prosperity, and achievement. It resulted from virtue, but also required external
goods, for example good birth, good children and beauty.
James Moor argues that there are certain underlying core values that all
people have (Moor, 1999). These are: life, happiness (pleasure), and autonomy.
In order to exercise our autonomy we require the ability to do various things, the
security to do them, the knowledge about doing them, the freedom and
opportunity to do them, and finally the resources to accomplish our goals. In
order to achieve a good life we require all of these, but different people will not
give all of the components the same weightings, and therefore conceptions of the
good life will be different for different people, but not radically so. Aristotle and
Moor both are talking about humans as they are now.
In the future, with human enhancements, things will be less clear. Do we
know if particular “enhancements” will improve life? Will enhanced people be
happier, and if not, why bother with enhancements? Can we say much about the
“good life” for an “enhanced” person? One important factor is this: Currently,
people around the world are more or less the same. We know in general what
sorts of things make people happy, what makes them suffer, what gives pleasure
and pain, and so on. If human enhancements become widespread, it is likely that
people will become very different from each other. Many different kinds of
enhancements, and enhancements to different levels may be possible, and if
people are free to choose, they will choose differently. So it may not be known
what should be done to relieve the suffering or increase the pleasure of others. In
an important respect, our commonality will be lost, and if this is so, the notion of
“the good life” becomes vacuous in the sense of being even a vague guide for
action.
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It is difficult to know whether enhancement would make life better
overall. Consider direct communication between brains: How would this affect
our privacy? Currently, my thoughts are mine alone, more or less, something for
which I am very grateful. This is not so much because I intentionally think things
that I should not, but more that I do not have the same sort of control over my
thoughts that I have over my actions. My autonomy would be reduced to the
extent that I would have much less control over what people knew about me, and
this would certainly make me more vulnerable to government and employer
control. Consider too enhanced senses: Suppose that I had the vision of an eagle.
I really cannot say that this would improve my life, because I have no idea what it
would be like.
Humans are basically social creatures who like living in groups, and this
aspect would appear to be under threat in a diversely enhanced world. Could one
be a friend of a much more enhanced person? Aristotle would probably say not.
Real friends must be equals. Could I understand this person? Wittgenstein would
have his doubts. While both Aristotle and Wittgenstein might both appear to
overstate the case, communication and friendship are easier between people who
are similar, and radical enhancements raise the possibility of very diverse groups
of humans (or creatures like humans) existing. Such considerations do suggest
that there would be a need to rethink what constitutes a good life, or even an
improved life, for humans.
H.

Rights & Obligations

18. Is there a right to be enhanced
Rights can be divided into two broad classes: a class of human rights, sometimes
called “natural rights”, and a class of more conventional rights based on the
specific customs, roles, and laws of a society. Examples of the former are
famously listed in the American Declaration of Independence: “We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.” The right to enhancement is not included in this
list or in other familiar lists of human rights. But it could be argued that a right of
enhancement is a right derived from some or all of the human rights like those
listed in the Declaration of Independence. Humans should be able to exercise
their right to enhancements to the extent that it promotes their life, liberty, or the
pursuit of happiness.
However, this at most would make a right to enhancement a prima facie
right because human rights themselves, though fundamental, can conflict and are
susceptible to modification and qualification. One’s right to liberty, for example,
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does not automatically permit infringement on the rights of others. Rights
frequently trump in our considerations about which action is correct. But rights
can also be trumped by other rights or by extremely harmful consequences.
Therefore, even if the right to enhancement is regarded as a derived human right,
its application in a particular situation could be challenged on the grounds that it
infringes on the rights of others or that its exercise would lead to extreme harm.
The right to enhancement can also be regarded as conventional.
“Conventional” does not mean “arbitrary” but “established by general agreement
or practice.” We can make laws, for example, that allow some enhancements and
laws that prohibit others. How justified such conventional rights or prohibitions
are depends upon how good the reasons for them are. We might easily justify the
use of nanodevices that patrol our bodies for cancerous outbreaks. We would
prohibit the use of nanodevices that would give humans a burst of intelligence
followed by likely seizures and strokes.
Discussion of rights remains controversial in philosophical circles. Some
argue that the justification of human enhancement in particular could be better
carried out in terms of fundamental values such as life, health, knowledge and
sociability (Hopkins, 2008). But arguments based on rights and arguments based
on human values tend to emphasize common notions of human dignity and the
good life.
19. Could human enhancement give us greater or fewer rights?
Future enhancements could either increase or decrease our rights. Today, this is
played out in the world of sports where the enhancements may come through the
use of drugs. Those in charge of a sport must set the rules to allow or forbid
enhancements. In swimming, some aquadynamic swimsuits are allowed and
some or not. Now suppose nanodevices of the future alter our bodies when we
are in the water to make us more aquadynamic. Should such enhanced swimmers
be allowed to compete against unenhanced swimmers? In situations like this,
judgments about rights that take into account fairness have to be made. The
nanoenhanced swimmers could be prohibited from competing at all or they could
be given a new right to compete within a new class of swimmers or, if the
nanoenhancement is easily obtainable by all competitors, the right to use it could
be extended to everyone. Consider the case of Oscar Pistorius, the South African
sprinter who had his legs amputated when he was a year old but now runs on
artificial legs (Edwards, 2008a). He missed the qualifying time for the 2008
Summer Olympics by just three-quarters of a second. Some argue that his new
legs, which give considerable spring to his run and do not require blood
circulation, have given him an enhancement that should not be allowed in races
with normal runners. Others argue that he should not lose the right to compete
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with non-disabled runners. The boundaries of our rights will continue to shift as
further enhancements are developed.
Beyond sports we might imagine what rights and duties would be affected
if future enhancements give some individuals in society much greater physical
and mental abilities than they have now: Should they have greater rights or
liberties than unenhanced persons? Would the enhanced then have some duty to
care for the unenhanced, just as the better-informed and capable parent has a duty
to care for her child? Human enhancement may create a wide moral chasm
between the haves and have-nots. In such a case, resolving issues of rights and
responsibilities will take on considerable importance to avoid significant social
and economic disruptive effects
20. Is there an obligation in some circumstance to be enhanced?
In some circumstances, there may be an obligation or at least a strong argument to
enhance. Assuming vaccinations are enhancements, we have an obvious example
of a case in which enhancements are required or at least strongly recommended.
We require pilots to have training and pass stringent tests, necessary for the
enhancements of a prospective pilot’s capabilities for everyone’s safety. Today,
prisoners wear ankle bracelets that transmit information about their location. This
is a kind of enhancement we allow, given prisoners have forfeited some of their
rights; moreover, there is a strong argument for doing this because it relieves
overpopulation in prisons while guarding against possible flight risk by a
nonviolent offender.
One area in which we can expect required enhancements to increase is the
military. In the military, soldiers have fewer rights than civilians; they lose
freedoms and have to obey reasonable orders. Of course, that is the issue: Is it
reasonable for the military to require enhancement of soldiers beyond their usual
training? One likely possibility is the use of nanochip “dog tags” that will allow
soldiers to be identified in case of death. Such chips could also be locators for
supervising officers to track them—how useful on the battlefield to know where
all of your soldiers are and know the state of their health. Naturally, weapons and
equipment will also be enhanced. Today, there are prototypes of devices that
make soldiers almost invisible by projecting the scene behind them in front of
them. But there is no reason to stop there. Why not implant devices so that
soldiers can be ordered to do what you want either through oral and written
commands or through direct connections to the decision and motor operations of
their brains? At some point, such enhancements have crossed the line of which
enhancements should be allowed, let alone required. Nevertheless, the need for
quick, effective, and decisive actions by the military will put significant pressure
toward producing a super soldier.
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21. Should children be enhanced?
Whether children should be enhanced is a particularly difficult issue. We give
adults considerable freedom to do what they wish to themselves, as long as it does
not harm others. But children are children. Parents must face the issue of
parental rights and responsibilities associated with decisions to enhance children,
whether directly (after the child is born) or indirectly through germ-line
enhancements (to the parent’s transmittable genes, prior to the child’s birth)
(Allhoff, 2005). This generates quandaries about selecting the proper actions that
will only be exacerbated by future enhancement possibilities through
nanotechnology.
On the one hand, if parents enhance children with
nanotechnology, they will be making crucial decisions about the capabilities of
their children that may be irreversible and limit their children’s future choices and
opportunities. Will the child agree with the choices when he or she is older? On
the other hand, parents already make similar choices in many areas on behalf of
their children. Insomuch as parents generally strive to provide the best for their
children—e.g., quality of school/education, a proper diet, moral guidance, etc.—
will enhancements overstep any bounds in that effort? Prevailing wisdom
suggests that parents do not have an unlimited right to raise their children
however they want; that right, if one exists, seems to be limited by health and
safety concerns related to the child.
Some have argued at least with regard to education that children possess a
further right beyond health and safety. Article 26 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the right to education and
that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
These rights in turn suggest duties for parents and for society. If education is a
kind of social enhancement, this lays the groundwork for claiming that other
kinds of enhancements might be the right of children and correlative duties of
parents and children. Will, for example, children of the future be expected to
receive enhancements of their bodies that lead to “the full development of human
personality”? Exactly what might be required will depend on the facts of the
situation, of course. As we have said, context matters. But what this account
shows is that there is at least a possible line of argument that supports not only the
right of children to be enhanced but also a duty of their parents or society to do it.
Another difficulty raised with enhancing children turns on the therapyenhancement distinction that we discussed in question 4. Therapy is often
required on a child’s behalf, whereas enhancement may be more voluntary. In the
deaf community, an ongoing debate occurs about whether treating deafness is
therapy or enhancement. Some in the deaf community maintain that being deaf is
not something that needs treating. The deaf community functions with its own
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language and community. This would be undermined if deafness were removed.
This leads some to argue that deaf children do not require therapy and there is no
decisive reason why deaf children should receive enhancement such as a cochlear
implant. Indeed, real-world cases exist in which, e.g., deaf parents have been
permitted to deliberately select embryos for in vitro fertilization that would lead to
deaf babies. Others believe that deafness requires therapy. On this latter view
there is much more pressure put on parents of a deaf child to perform their duty of
care toward health and safety and install a cochlear implant for therapeutic
reasons.
Another common concern about enhancing children lies in the possibility
that parents will enhance their children to give them an edge in society. Rather
than simply buying them new laptops for school, in the future parents might buy
nanochips for their children’s bodies. The size of our working memory has much
to do with our intelligence. Suppose some nanochips could be added to instantly
give children a larger working memory; what an advantage they would have over
other children without them. Of course, it is not only cognitive enhancement but
also the enhancement of beauty and functionality of other parts of the body that
might be possible. Beauty queens and track stars could be made, improving the
outcomes of the genetic lottery. The likely result of such an enhancement race by
parents will strike many as an unhealthy and unsound approach to developing the
potential children—but how do we prevent it?
I.

Policy & Law

22. What are the policy implications of human enhancement?
Given the preceding discussion, it should be clear that human enhancement is
more than just about the individual’s freedom or autonomy: there are plausibly
negative consequences on others and society that need to be considered. Or at
least an argument needs to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps all other
values, but such a position seems unnecessarily dogmatic. These issues point to
the policy dilemma of whether we should have regulations or restrictions on
human enhancement technologies, so to prevent or mitigate some of the negative
impacts considered. Three answers suggest themselves: (1) no restrictions, (2)
some restrictions, or (3) a moratorium or full ban.
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent that a worldwide one would
be needed to truly stem the use of human enhancement technologies, and that no
worldwide moratorium on anything has yet been shown to work, including on
(alleged) attempts to clone a human being. A local moratorium would send
patients to “back-alley” enhancement clinics or to more liberal regions of the
world, as is the case with “cosmetic-surgery vacations” to countries in which
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those medical procedures are less expensive in other nations. Further, a ban on
enhancement research seems much too premature—an overreaction to perceived,
future risks—as well as a real threat to therapy-related research today.
On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of having no restrictions on
human enhancement technologies seems to be reckless or at least unjustifiably
optimistic, given that there are plausible risks. As pointed out earlier, complete
freedom or autonomy may be a recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we do
not want to grant the right to yell “Fire!” in a crowded venue or the right of
dangerous felons to own firearms.3
So what about finding middle ground with some non-Draconian
regulations? Critics have argued that any regulation would be imperfect and
likely ineffectual, much like laws against contraband or prostitution (Naam,
2005); but it is not clear that eliminating these laws would improve the situation,
all things considered. Also, as a society, we still believe we ought to at least try to
solve social ills, even if we cannot ultimately fix the entire problem, e.g., we
cannot stop any given crime from ever occurring again, yet we still have laws
against such acts. And even if there are practical reasons not to pursue regulation,
would that send the wrong message; e.g., to children, that we support
enhancement without reservations?
The issue of regulation will surely not be settled here, nor do we intend it
to. Yet it is important to keep in mind that the human enhancement debate is not
just a theoretical discussion about ethics, but it has bearing on the real world with
policy decisions that may affect not just the would-be enhanced, but also
researchers, manufacturers, social institutions, as well as our ideals of freedom
and human dignity (Lin, 2007).
23. Should there be limits on enhancements, e.g., for military purposes?
At this stage, without knowing exactly what kinds of human-enhancing devices
and treatments will be invented, the answer is unclear. As we discussed
previously, there may be a compelling case to limit those enhancements that pose
serious health risks to the individual or profoundly upset social institutions, at
least until we are able to evolve those institutions—such as sports or college
admissions—to account for an enhancement divide.
Gratuitous enhancements seem to be an easy case. To the extent that they
are not harmful to the individual, e.g., an ordinary tattoo, and are not public
nuisances, e.g., a profane and visible tattoo that offends the sensibilities of others,
there does not seem to be a compelling reason to limit them, apart from some
argument that they desecrate the body and impinge upon human dignity. Un3

Perhaps even the right to be happy may be inappropriately exercised, say, at a funeral?
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enhancements (see question 8 above) pose a more difficult case study in that we
must balance the interest and expressed will of the individual against what most
persons would consider to be deliberate and serious harm to one’s self.
Military applications of human enhancement technologies presents an
even trickier moral and social dilemma: should we be in the business of
weaponizing or modifying humans for someone else’s ends, specifically to inflict
harm on others or otherwise better prosecute a war (American Association for the
Advancement of Science, 2006)? We will also not fully address such a
complicated issue here, except to note that it involves considerations related to
arms proliferation (e.g., does this encourage other nations to invest in similar
research?), national priorities (e.g., might research funding be better spent
elsewhere, given that any advantage we gain may be temporary until our enemies
replicate our technologies, as they historically do?), asymmetrical warfare (e.g., if
enemies are more easily defeated by our super-soldiers, will they adapt by taking
more desperate measures, such as more aggressively pursuing nuclear or
biochemical weapons?), and other issues familiar to ethics and warfare.
24. Might enhanced humans count as someone’s intellectual property?
Generally speaking, naturally-occurring objects (e.g., air, water, other raw
materials) cannot be patented, and human beings cannot be legally owned; so
whether one could patent or otherwise claim intellectual property (IP) rights over
an enhanced human seems to be a moot question. However, there might be more
to this issue, once we recognize the related debate on biotechnology patenting,
specifically as it relates to genomics. (Engineered biomedical devices, such as an
artificial heart or knee, would clearly be patent-eligible under existing US law,
though we will return shortly to the question of whether they ought to be.)
In the US, the biotechnology-patenting debate starts with the landmark
legal decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which the Supreme Court (by a narrow
5-4 margin) ruled that a genetically-modified, oil-eating bacterium—which is not
naturally occurring—is patent-eligible (US Supreme Court, 1980). Since then,
the courts have also established that parts or sequences of genes, though not the
entire gene itself, may be patented if its function is also articulated (e.g., US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2009). Thus, it is possible that some sequence
of a gene may be discovered, isolated, and functionalized in a human-enhancing
application, e.g., to slow or halt aging or give us superhuman strength or vision.
If that happens, then the usual consequences of patent protection would likely
occur, i.e., the cost of such a procedure or drug would be high, at least for the first
20 years, given a lack of direct competitors.
This particular consequence strikes at the core of the access concern, as
discussed previously: Whether through genomics, robotics, or other technologies,
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the ability to acquire enhanced abilities will turn on the individual’s ability to pay.
Putting aside the issue of whether we have a right to enhance ourselves and how
that is impacted by the high cost of such devices and treatments, it may be
reasonably expected that IP law would create an “enhancement divide” between
the enhanced (those who can afford it) and unenhanced (those who cannot afford
to pay), which is cause for concern.
Furthermore, again setting rights aside, it will undoubtedly be argued that
some human-enhancing treatments ought to belong to all of humanity and not be
protected by IP law. For instance, it would seem immoral to withhold or
otherwise raise barriers (such as to charge a price that some are unable to pay) to
receive some therapy that can cure cancer or aging, just as it is to deny access to
basic materials needed for our survival, e.g., food and water. Such IP may
represent essential discoveries needed to move science ahead: for instance, in
nanotechnology, there are already criticisms that patents are a hindrance to basic
science (Bawa, 2004). As an analogy, imagine how stunted science would be if
the first microscope had been patented and its use restricted to only those who
could afford to pay a licensing fee, or how radically different our world today
would be if merely accessing the Internet required a similar use-fee (on top of any
service provider fees). Further, it can be—and has been—claimed that all IP
rights are harmful to innovation and indeed contradict the basic principles of a
free-market economy, since they are essentially legalized monopolies (Boldrin
and Levine, 2008; Torrance and Tomlinson, 2009). Without the protection of
patents and copyrights, companies would be forced to compete on price, quality,
customer service, and so on, which is a competition that seems to be good for
broader public. Open-source computing is an example of such a business model.
Of course, the opposing side will rely on the standard argument that IP
rights are a necessary form of incentive for innovation: without IP protection,
companies and individuals would be much less likely to risk investing time and
research funds to develop products that can simply be copied by competitors
(Lessig, 2002). We will not engage this larger debate on whether or not IP law
promotes social goods, except to reiterate that it has a bearing on the issue of
fairness and access to human enhancement technologies.
25. Will we need to rethink ethics itself?4
To a large extent, our ethics depends on the kinds of creatures that we are.
Philosophers traditionally have based ethical theories on assumptions about
human nature. With enhancements we may become relevantly different creatures
4
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and therefore need to rethink our basic ethical positions. For example, will we be
as sympathetic toward other humans that differ substantially from us in their
nature? We may need to do ethics differently. Converging technologies—for
example, nanotechnology, neurotechnology, genetics and information
technology—will almost certainly enable some dramatic enhancements, at least in
the medium term.
The emergence of these potentially powerful technologies raises the
question of what our technological future will be like. Will the quality of our
lives improve with increased technology or not? We at least collectively can
affect our futures by choosing which technologies to have and which not to have
and by choosing how technologies that we pursue will be used. The question
really is: How well will we choose? The emergence of a wide variety of new
technologies should give us a sense of urgency in thinking about how we
approach these technologies and enhancements ethically. Which kinds should we
develop and keep? And, how should we utilize those that we do keep? It is not
satisfactory to do ethics as usual. Better ethical thinking in terms of being better
informed and better ethical action in terms of being more proactive are required.
Technologies, particularly new converging technologies for human
enhancement, generate many ethical problems. Sometimes the problems can be
treated easily under existing ethical policies. But because new technology allows
us to perform activities in new ways, situations may arise in which we do not have
adequate policies in place to guide us. We are confronted with policy vacuums.
We need to formulate and justify new policies (laws, rules, and customs) for
acting in these new kinds of situations. Sometimes we can anticipate that the use
of the technology will have consequences that are clearly undesirable. As much
as possible, we need to anticipate these and establish policies that will minimize
the deleterious effects of the new technology. At other times the subtleties of the
situation may escape us, at least initially, and we will find ourselves in a situation
of assessing the matter as consequences unfold. Formulating and justifying new
policies is complicated by the fact that the concepts that we bring to a policyvacuum situation may not provide a unique understanding of the situation: the
situation may have analogies with different and competing traditional situations.
We find ourselves in a conceptual muddle about which way to understand the
matter in order to formulate and justify a policy.
To avoid such a quandary, first, we need realistically to take into account
that ethics is an ongoing and dynamic enterprise. Second, we can improve ethics
by establishing better collaborations among ethicists, scientists, social scientists,
and technologists. We need a multi-disciplinary approach (Brey, 2000). The
third improvement for ethics would be to develop more sophisticated ethical
analyses. Ethical theories themselves are often simplistic and do not give much
guidance to particular situations. Often the alternative is to do technological
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assessment in terms of cost/benefit analysis. This approach too easily invites
evaluation in terms of money while ignoring or discounting moral values which
are difficult to represent or translate into monetary terms. At the very least, we
need to be more proactive and less reactive in doing ethics (Moor and Weckert,
2004).
J.

Conclusion

In the above, we offer a preliminary survey of many of the major questions in the
ethics debate on human enhancement. A full discussion is beyond the scope of
this investigation and, indeed, could take an entire book to satisfactorily answer
each question. But our brief introduction here is valuable as an entry point to the
human enhancement ethics controversy, which is quickly gaining momentum and
complexity.
An impressive array of technologies is driving the urgency of this debate,
from familiar drugs (e.g., steroids, modafinil, Ritalin) to fantastic visions of a
cybernetic future. No one knows which visions—utopian, dystopian, or
pedestrian—ultimately will be realized. But insofar as there are good reasons to
think that many of these visions are plausible, it seems prudent to at least begin a
conversation about the many ethical and social issues associated with human
enhancement, especially since ethics seem to historically lag (far) behind
technology and other quickly-evolving events. By planning ahead, we can be
better prepared to enact legislation or regulation as deemed fit.
In our discussions, we have striven to follow a disinterested, sensible
middle path in presenting the various sides of each issue, given the early stage of
this debate, though clearly there are passionate and opposing forces engaged in
this international struggle for clarity and policy. An increasing flow of thoughtful
literature exists as we write this (e.g., Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009), and we
expect the arguments to continue for many more years—proving the prediction
that human enhancement ethics will be the most important debate in science and
society is this brave new century. Because human enhancement is such a personal
matter, for the moment, we leave it to our readers to use their own moral compass
to navigate these myriad camps and find their own path to ethical answers.
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